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## The Soul theory of the Buddhists.

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(Presented to the Academy 6 November 1918).

[§ 14. Is there any cognising agent?].

*Vatsīputrīya*. There are others who argue as follows: (a Soul must exist), because wherever there is an activity it depends on an agent. Every action depends on an agent as, f. i. in the example «Devadatta walks» there is an action of walking which depends on Devadatta the agent. To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who cognises must also exist<sup>49</sup>. 104. b. 5  
(8b-3).

*Vasubandhu*. It must be explained what this Devadatta is.

*Vatsīputrīya*. It is an Ego.

*Vasubandhu*. That is begging the question!

*Vatsīputrīya*. It is what in common life we call a man.

*Vasubandhu*. This does not represent any unity whatsoever. It is a name given to such elements (of which a man is composed). The elements are meant when we say «Devadatta walks». When we say that «consciousness cognises», it is just the same.

*Vatsīputrīya*. And what is the meaning of the expression «Devadatta walks», (if there is no individuality whatsoever)?

*Vasubandhu*. It is an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity, and to which they give the name of Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned (by an analogy with their own experience, because) their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. But this movement is but a (series of new) productions in different places, just as the expressions «fire moves», «sound spreads» have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words «Devadatta

cognises» in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments being called Devadatta). (But is it simple people alone whose language is so inadequate?). Great men have likewise condescended to denote the (mentioned facts) by such (inadequate) expressions, when they were pleased to use the language of common life.

*Vatsīputrīya*. But we read in Scripture: «consciousness apprehends». What is consciousness here meant to do?

*Vasubandhu*. Nothing at all! (It simply appears in coordination with its objective elements, like a result which is homogeneous with its cause). When a result appears in conformity with its own cause it is doing nothing at all, nevertheless we say that it does conform with it. Consciousness likewise appears in coordination with its objective elements<sup>50</sup>. It is (properly speaking) doing nothing. Nevertheless we say that consciousness does cognise its object.

*Vatsīputrīya*. What is meant by coordination (between consciousness and its objective element)?

*Vasubandhu*. A conformity between them, the fact owing to which cognition, although caused (also) by the activity of the senses, is not something homogeneous with them. It is said to cognise the object and not the senses. (It bears the reflection of the objective element, which is his corollary). And again the expression «consciousness apprehends» is not inadequate, inasmuch as here also a continuity of conscious moments is the cause of every cognition. («Consciousness apprehends» means that the previous moment is the cause of the following one). The agent here also denotes simply the cause, just as in the current expression «the bell resounds», (the bell is doing nothing, but every following moment of sound is produced by the previous one). (We can give) an other (illustration): «consciousness apprehends» similarly to the way in which a light moves.

195. a. 6.

*Vatsīputrīya*. And how does a light move?

*Vasubandhu*. The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved, (but in reality other flames have appeared in another place). Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i. e. appears in coordination with another objective element) we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we are speaking about the existence of material elements. We say matter «is produced», «it exists», but

there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness, (there is nothing that does cognise, apart from the evanescent flashings of consciousness itself).

[§ 15. Sāṃkhya views discussed].

*Sāṃkhya*. If consciousness is not a product of a Soul, (if it has no other cause than consciousness itself), the following moment springing up from the preceding one, then how is it to be explained 1) that it does not remain perpetually just the same, and 2) (if there be a change), why not in a fixed order of succession, like a sprout, a stem, leaves etc. (produced from a seed)?

*Vasubandhu*. (As regards the first point, we answer that) all elements which partake in the process of life are characterised by a constant change, (they have no duration). They constitute a stream in which the next moment is necessarily different from the preceding one. Such is the inmost nature of every thing living!

(*Sāṃkhya*. There are exceptions! f. i. in cataleptic states neither body nor mind undergo any change).

*Vasubandhu*. If there really were exceptions (to the principle of Universal Change), and if the ascetics after being merged in transic meditation and having reached the climax of it would really appear in a state of perfect identity of body and mind, (without absolutely any change in them), then there could be no difference between the last and the first moment of such a state of meditation, and there could be no spontaneous awakening from the trance in the last moment. (Therefore there is an imperceptible constant change going on even in such states as catalepsy).

(As regards the second point we maintain that in the continuous stream of ideas there positively is a fixed order of succession: if one idea springs up from another one, it does so with necessity. There is a certain affinity (between ideas), in virtue of which there are ideas somehow similar to others and having the power of evoking them. As f. i. when the idea of a woman is immediately associated (in the mind of an ascetic) with the idea of an impure body, or (in the mind of a married man) with the idea of her husband, son etc., and if later on, in the changing stream of thought, the same idea of a woman reappears, it has the power of evoking these ideas of an impure body or of a husband, son etc., because they are associated with it, but it has not the power of evoking other (ideas, not so associated). Again the idea of a female may be followed by various ideas arising one after another, (but if

we examine them, we shall find) that only such ideas really appear which are either very common (in the corresponding stream of thought), or most intensely felt in it, or (at last) have been experienced at a very recent date. The reason for this is that the Vital Energy<sup>51</sup> of such ideas has more power (to the exclusion of other influences), except (of course) the influence of the present state of one's body and the immediate objects of cognition.

*Sāṃkhya*. If this Vital Energy (inherent in ideas) has so powerful an influence, why does it not produce perpetually (its own, one and the same) result?

*Vasubandhu*. Because (as we have said above) the elements partaking in the process of life are characterised by a perpetual change. In conformity with this principle of Universal Change the Vital Energy itself is perpetually changing and so does its result (the idea). This is only an abridged account of all the modes (of association) between ideas. A thorough going and full knowledge of them belongs to Buddha. This has been stated (by Rāhula, the Elder) in the following stanza:

Every variety of cause  
Which brings about the glittering shine  
In a single eye of a peacocks tail  
Is not accessible to limited understanding.  
The Omniscient knows them all!

(If this is true in respect to complicated material phenomena), how much more is it with respect to immaterial, mental phenomena!

[§ 16. Vaiçeṣika views discussed].

106. a. 2. *Vasubandhu*. Now there are some heterodox (Vaiçeṣika) teachers who maintain that ideas are the product of a Soul. (The above mentioned two arguments which were brought forth by the Sāṃkhya philosopher against us) will prove most strong against this Vaiçeṣika doctrine. Namely we shall ask: (if the different conscious ideas are products of an eternal Soul) 1) why is the following consciousness not constantly the same as the foregoing one? and 2) why do ideas not appear in a fixed order of succession, as f. i. a sprout, a stem, leaves etc. (from a seed)?

*Vaiçeṣika*. (The change in the stream of thought) depends upon a special contact between the Soul and a (moving) Internal Organ?

*Vasubandhu*. No! (because we altogether do not admit the existence of real conjunctions). Since there are none in other cases, (neither can we admit

any contact between Soul and Internal Organ). (But supposing conjunctions between elements to be possible), then two objects coming into contact must occupy definite places. The same consequence — namely that Soul and Internal Organ must be definitely localised — follows out of your explanation of what a contact is. (What indeed is your definition?) — «a contact is a conjunction of what previously was disjointed».<sup>51</sup> Therefore if the Internal Organ shifts its place, the Soul must shift likewise, or disappear altogether, (when no contact between them is to take place). (All this runs against your theory of a limitless, eternal, unmoving Soul).

*Vaiçesika*. The contact may be (between the Internal Organ) and a part of the Soul?

*Vasubandhu*. It is not admitted that the Soul (representing a unity) is divisible into parts. But supposing the contact really takes place, it nevertheless cannot account for a change in the stream of thought. The Internal Organ itself is admitted by you to be eternally the same (unchanging), how then could its contacts be different (changing)?

*Vaiçesika*. But then (the change in the stream of thought) may be produced by the change of cognition (which we admit to be a quality of the Soul)?

*Vasubandhu*. We will make the same objection (as above with regard to the Internal Organ): how is the change of cognition to be explained?

*Vaiçesika*. (The change of cognition) may be produced from a contact between the Soul and the Internal Organ, which contact is influenced by a variety of Forces (inhering in the Soul)? (The variety of cognitions is produced by the variety of these Forces, while the Soul and the Internal Organ remain eternally changeless).

*Vasubandhu*. In that case consciousness alone influenced by a variety of Forces will do! We do not perceive the slightest influence of a (permanent) Soul! This soul resembles magical formulas «phut! svāhā!» muttered by a quack when the result is achieved by (simple) medicine!

*Vaiçesika*. But the existence of both these (Cognitions and Forces) is conditioned by the existence of a Soul?

*Vasubandhu*. Mere words! (That is no proof of a Soul's existence).

*Vaiçesika*. (It is a proof!) Soul is the (common) support (for both Cognitions and Forces).

*Vasubandhu*. Support in what sense? They cannot be supported in the sense in which a picture is supported on the wall, or a badara fruit supported by a plate! Nor can the Soul afford them any such support. (Such a relation

of support and supported is only possible) between material resisting objects, occupying a separate place, and this is not admitted by you (with respect to the Soul and the elements it is supposed to support).

*Vaiçeṣika.* But the Soul may be a support in another sense?

*Vasubandhu.* In what sense?

*Vaiçeṣika.* In the sense in which the element «earth» is deemed to be the substratum of odour and other (sensible qualities).

*Vasubandhu.* Yes, of course! This example is very much to my satisfaction, because I hold to the principle, that there is no Soul! Just as there is no earth apart from odour and other (sensible qualities, just so is there no Soul apart from consciousness and mental phenomena). Who indeed has ever had any definite cognition of earth? (It is simply a special combination of sensible qualities which in common life is called by the name «earth». A special combination of mental qualities is likewise designated by the name «I»).

*Vaiçeṣika.* But how is it then that we use the expression: «earth possesses odour etc.», (i. e. we distinguish between the possessor and the thing possessed)?

*Vasubandhu.* We use it in order to distinguish (earth from other substances). We say «earth has odour etc.» in order to make it known that this very odour etc. alone and nothing else is called «earth», just as we use the expression «image of wood», (i. e. the image is wood, apart from the wood there is no image, but it is thus distinguished from an earthenware image etc.).

Again supposing there is a Soul which produces cognitions under the influence of a variety of Forces, why then are all cognitions not produced at once?

*Vaiçeṣika.* Because the stronger Force checks the influence of the others.

*Vasubandhu.* Why then does not this stronger Force perpetually produce the same result?

*Vaiçeṣika.* The nature of these (our) Forces is just the same as that of (yours) Vital Energy, (it is not constant, but always changing).

*Vasubandhu.* But then what is the use of surmising the existence of a Soul?

*Vaiçeṣika.* The existence of the Soul must necessarily be admitted (for the following consideration:) memory and all other mental phenomena belong to the category of qualities and these must necessarily be inherent in

some substance. Since all other substances cannot constitute a substratum (for mental qualities, the special substance in which they inhere must be the Soul. Its existence is thus proved).

*Vasubandhu.* No, it is not proved! It is not proved that these mental phenomena belong to the category of qualities. According to our system whatsoever exists is a substance. And this is corroborated by Scripture declaring: «the result of the pure life of an ascetic are six substances» (pure physics, feelings, ideas, volitions, consciousness and the Absolute; they are all called «substances», not «qualities»). Hence it is likewise not proved that these (memory and other mental phenomena) must inhere in some substance. The meaning of the term «support» (or substratum of qualities) has already been analyzed above. Therefore this (whole argument) is irrelevant.

*Vaiçeṣika.* If there is no Self, what for are actions (good or bad) undertaken? 106. b. 8.

*Vasubandhu.* They are undertaken in the hope: «I will be happy!» «I shall escape misfortune!»

*Vaiçeṣika.* And what is this so called «I» (in its true nature)?

*Vasubandhu.* It is (nothing else than) the objective element with regard to which there arises selfperception.

*Vaiçeṣika.* And what is this object of selfperception?

*Vasubandhu.* (It is the continuous streaming of) the elements constituting a personal life.

*Vaiçeṣika.* How is that known?

*Vasubandhu.* From two facts: 1) we feel attachment towards these (elements: our physical frame, our ideas etc.); and 2) (the notion of an «I») is the common subject for such predicates as «fair complexion» etc. (which have an immediate bearing to the physical or some other element of a personal life). Thus people use to say «I am fair», «I am dark», «I am fat», «I am lean», «I am old», «I am young». We notice that these ideas of «fair» etc. are predicates connected with the idea of a Self as their common subject. But you do not admit (your) Soul to have such characteristics, (as fair etc.). Thus we conclude that selfperception is simply a perception of the elements.

*Vaiçeṣika.* (This is only a metaphorical application of the term «I», 107. a. 3. when it is spoken of as being fair etc.). It is also metaphorically used to designate the body, since the body is the guardian of the «I». Just as a king when speaking of his minister might say: «he is my (second) Self!»

*Vasubandhu* Indeed, a useful thing might be metaphorically called a Self, but not selfperception itself!

*Vaiçesika*. If you admit that selfperception may have the body for its object, why do you not admit that it may also have the body of another person for its object?

*Vasubandhu*. Because it has no (direct) connection (with the body of another person). This selfperception appears exclusively with respect to that body or that mind which are in direct connection with it, but not with respect to another (body or mind). (Why?) This is an inveterated habit (to hold to these elements as if they were «mine»), a habit acquired in the beginningless process (of Life's Evolution).

*Vaiçesika*. An what is here meant by connection?

*Vasubandhu*. It is a relation of cause to effect.

*Vaiçesika*. But if there is no Soul, whose is this selfperception, (whom does it belong to)?

*Vasubandhu*. This would be the place to repeat all what we have said above on the question «whose is memory, whom does it belong to?», beginning with the words «what is the meaning of the Genitive «whose?» and concluding with the statement «it has the meaning of a cause».

*Vaiçesika*. And what is the cause of this selfperception?

*Vasubandhu*. It is an idea imbued with Illusion, an idea which has for its object the stream of elements constituting one's own personal life. Through the constant former practice of this perception of one's self it has become an idea deeply rooted (in the habitual modes of thought of mankind).

*Vaiçesika*. And now, if there is no Self, who is it that feels happy, who is it that suffers?

*Vasubandhu*. It is the substratum where pleasure or pain appear, just as flowers grow on a tree and fruit are grown in a garden, (this does not prove the tree or the garden to be ultimate realities).

*Vaiçesika*. And what constitutes a substratum for pleasure and pain?

*Vasubandhu*. The subjective elements of life, the so called six subjective «bases». In what sense they are constituting such a substratum has been explained (in the first chapter).<sup>51</sup>

107. b. 1. *Vaiçesika*. If there is no (permanent) Soul, who is the agent that accomplishes actions and who the enjoyer that enjoys their result?

*Vasubandhu*. What is the meaning of the terms agent and enjoyer?

*Vaiçesika*. The agent is the one who acts, the enjoyer the one who enjoys.

*Vasubandhu.* This is a verbal explanation, it does not explain the meaning.

*Vaiçeṣika.* The logicians give the following definition of an agent: «what is endowed with a free will is an agent». <sup>52</sup> We see f. i. that in common life some people are free to accomplish some aims, as f. i. we see that Devadatta is free to perform his ablutions, to eat, to walk (whenever he likes).

*Vasubandhu.* But who is this Devadatta you give us as an example? If you understand him to be a real Self, it will be begging the question. But if you refer to the elements, this agent is not free. Actions in general are of three kinds. They are either bodily motions or speech or thoughts. As regards the body and the speech, their activity is going on under the influence of the foreign will of thought. But thought also, in directing the body and the speech, is operating under the influence of the foreign will of its own causes. Since thought itself (in its own activity) is in a similar condition, there is nowhere any free will. Whatever exists is living under the foreign will of (inexorable) conditions. Neither do we admit the Soul to be an independent cause, therefore it cannot be proved that it is endowed with a Free Will. It follows that such an agent as has been defined by the logicians is absolutely not to be found. If among the causes producing an event there is a principal one, we may call it the agent producing this event. But in (your) Soul we do not see the slightest productive activity, therefore it cannot be admitted as an agent even in this sense.

*(Vaiçeṣika.* And how are actions according to your opinion produced?)

*Vasubandhu.* A remembrance evokes an inclination, from which a searching state of mind is produced. Then comes (the feeling) of an effort and this feeling evokes motive energy. The motive energy produces an action. What (on earth) has a Soul to do in all that?!

Again there is no (permanent) Soul, that could (really enjoy) the 107. b. 7. results (of former actions).

*Vaiçeṣika.* But (there may be something else with respect to which the Soul) can be metaphorically understood to be the enjoyer?

*Vasubandhu.* What is it?

*Vaiçeṣika.* Is it not our consciousness (of the results of actions)?

*Vasubandhu.* No! We have already dispensed with the theory, that consciousness is a product of the Soul. Therefore the Soul can have no power of producing a knowledge (of the results of actions).

*Vaiçeṣika.* But if there is no Soul, how is it to be explained, that there is no accumulation of merit or demerit in the inanimate world?

*Vasubandhu.* Because it does not serve as a substratum for feeling. The six categories of subjective elements alone can serve as a substratum (for feeling etc.), but not a Soul. How this (serving as a substratum is to be understood) has been explained (just above).

*Vaiçesika.* But if there is no Soul, how do you account for the fact, that an action which no more exists produces nevertheless a result at a later period?

*Vasubandhu.* And if it did exist, how would you account for it?

*Vaiçesika.* The results are produced from merit and demerit, which are qualities inhering in the Soul, (and which are the immediate products of actions).

*Vasubandhu.* This argument has been already (implicitly) disposed of just above, when we analyzed the idea of inherence (of qualities in a substratum) and asked for examples illustrating this relation. Therefore (your qualities) of merit and demerit do not at all inhere in a substance, (i. e. in your Soul). But neither do we maintain that future results are produced from actions, which exist no more!

*Vaiçesika.* But from what?

*Vasubandhu.* (They are immediately produced) from a characteristic change (the ultimate phase) in the uninterrupted stream of elements originating from these (actions), just as the fruit is produced (gradually) from a seed. If people f. i. say that the fruit is produced from the seed, they don't mean that the fruit is produced from a (non-existing) destroyed seed, neither do they suppose that the fruit will be produced immediately from the seed alone.

*Vaiçesika.* But what do they mean?

*Vasubandhu.* (It is the immediate product of the ultimate) phase in the process of development, (which begins by the seed), i. e. after the seed there arises a sprout, a stem, leaves etc, till at last the series is closed by a flower which immediately produces (the fruit).

*Vaiçesika.* But if the fruit is produced from the flower, why do people say that it is produced from the seed?

*Vasubandhu.* Because the (seed) has indirectly introduced into the flower its own capacity (influence). If the flower were not imbued with this capacity, it would not have the power of producing a fruit of the same kind (as the seed). Similary if we say that actions have results, this neither means that an unexisting action produces a result, nor does it mean that rétribution follows immediately on the action.

*Vaiçesika*. And what does it mean?

*Vasubandhu*. It simply means that the result springs up from an ultimate phase in a continuity (of evolution which begins with that action).

*Vaiçesika*. What is meant by a continuity, what by a change in it, and 108. a. 7. what by the ultimate phase of it?

*Vasubandhu*. A continuity is a continually reverting origination of (new moments of) consciousness which are following on an action. Every following moment (being a more or less modified combination of elements) is different from the preceding moment. A change which has the capacity of immediately producing the result is called the characteristic (or ultimate) change, because it is specially distinguished from other changes, as f. i. consciousness in the moment of death (represents such an ultimate characteristic change, since it is followed by consciousness) assuming a new existence.<sup>56</sup>

(*Vaiçesika*. But a present condition of body and mind may have been preceded by different kinds of actions. Among them what are the actions which in first place will influence the subsequent evolution?)

*Vasubandhu*. When many various actions are the starting point (of one 108. b. 1. single stream of evolution), then those among them that are weighty, near in time, or grown into habit have a stronger power (of vitality), they clearly manifest their results to the exclusion of the remaining ones. Accordingly it is said (by Rāhula):

«Among the actions going round (from birth to death)  
Those will be ripening first in order,  
That are weighty, or are near,  
Then those one's got accustomed to,  
And (lastly the remaining) ones.»

In a single continuity of a personal life four kinds of actions can be distinguished: actions of great weight, actions near in time, actions grown into habit, and the remaining preceding actions (of the same existence). Among these four categories a weighty action ripens first, i. e. it ripens sooner than the three other categories. Among those that are near, habitual, or simply preceding (unqualified), those that are near ripen before the two other categories. Among the habitual and preceding ones, the habitual ripen first i. e. before the (remaining) single (category of actions unqualified). When all these categories are exhausted (i. e. all actions of the present life have given their result), then come actions that will bear their result (in the

present existence though they were committed in a previous birth, i. e. such former actions the result of which has to be experienced in a future existence).<sup>54</sup>

[§ 17. Gradual extinction of all elements of life].

108. b. 3. Now, among the elements appearing in an existence some have the character of retribution for previous deeds. After having produced such retribution the force of these former deeds vanishes. (and produces no further result). Other elements again have the character of homogeneous results, being brought forth by the force of homogeneousness inherent in former deeds. These latter elements, if they are associated with worldly attachment, continue to reappear until an antidote for them is produced (in the shape of transcendent Wisdom). After that such elements only remain which are free from worldly attachment, (which constitute the perfect Saint). They also cease to appear for ever after Final Rescue has been reached at. (since then the continuity of elements of matter and mind ceases for ever).

108. b. 5. *Vaiçesika*. But the elements which have been produced as a retribution for former deeds, why do they not produce retribution in their turn, just as some corn produced from a seed has the capacity of producing new corn?

*Vasubandhu*. The example may not fit in every detail. But even supposing it to be fitting, does it prove your tenet? Is the new corn produced from the old corn directly?

*Vaiçesika*. From what then?

*Vasubandhu*. The new corn is produced by a new special process of maturation. When the corn produced from the (first) seed combines with such conditions as soil, moisture etc., a special process of maturation is produced. Strictly speaking this corn may be called seed only after having reached the state of decomposition which immediately precedes the production of the sprout. Previously to that it may be so called only by anticipation (because it may become a seed), or owing to its similarity (with a real seed). What produces the result is not the corn by itself, but the «special modification» it has reached under favourable conditions. Thus interpreted the simile may be applied to the Elements of life, which have been produced as a retribution for former deeds. Although they by themselves have no force of producing any further result, they might become associated with such conditions as are able to produce good or bad results, f. i. a study of the right doctrine or a study of a false doctrine. In that case the result might

become capable to attract elements either favourable or unfavourable (to salvation). The neutral consciousness arising from among these elements and getting continuously modified might become capable of attracting such elements as will constitute a «special modification» in this stream of thought, and from this special modification, not from anything else, a later result may be produced. Thus the simile might be applied to the Elements of life.

Or we may illustrate this process by an other simile, where the new 108. b. 8. result is produced by introducing a new element. If a kind of red dye is applied to the flowers of a citron tree the result will be a pink citron fruit, produced from a «special modification» in the constant change that the flowers will unhergo. But such a pink citron fruit will not produce another pink citron, its seed will produce only a normal yellow one. Just in this manner it must be understood that when an action is neutralised by retribution this neutralisation must be regarded as final, it is not capable of producing any further result.

I have mentioned here only some rough characteristics of actions and 109. a. 2. their results, as far as they are accessible to my own limited understanding. But the continuous stream of elements influenced by actions of different force may attain different kinds of special modifications which will produce corresponding results. This is a field accessible to the knowledge of Buddhas only. Accordingby it has been said: «Former deeds are exercising an influence upon later events, this influence manifests itself in various ways, the result of a former deed appears in the course of the manifestations of its influence. To some extent this is generally known, but) no one else than a Buddha always precisely knows, what has been the former deed, what influence it has assumed, what is the course of events in which it manifests itself and what will its final result be». <sup>55</sup>

Mere Elements exist! There is no Soul!  
This stainless doctrine of the Buddhas,  
In perfect argument exposed,  
The Saint perceives in pure intuition.  
Wrong, stubborn dogma he rejects,  
Professed by blind heretics.  
In perfect clearness of his sight,  
He calmly wanders through these worlds  
T'wards life's Repose Eternal.  
Like a broad way in broad daylight

109. a. 4.

By rays of sun illuminated,  
So is this Soulesness disclosed  
By words of sunlike Buddhas,  
It is the only glorious path  
T'wards Final Rescue's City.  
The path is open to the wise,  
T'is trodden by saints in thousands.  
But simple people nonetheless,  
Their sight obstructed by delusion  
Do not perceive the glorious path,  
Cannot conceive that there's no Soul.

Of this deep doctrine for the learned  
I made a short exposure,  
By their schooled mind they will pervade  
The whole with strength unfettered.  
Like poison are they, these learned men:  
One only spot it enters,  
And then pervades by its own force  
All limbs without exception. <sup>56</sup>

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NOTES.

In the introduction to our translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti (in russian), we have expressed our opinion about the manner whow complicated gātra works should be translated. A litteral translation of them can be used only by those who are able to read the original, it would be rather a guide for reading the text, than an independent translation. If the ideas, and not the words, must be translated, the translator should strive to grasp the idea of the original as closely as possible, and then express it in another language in the way in which a modern thinker would have done it, if he happened to have the same idea. A double translation, one quite litteral and the other quite free, would have met all demands. We have given such a double translation of the tract of Dharmakīrti on Solipsism (Santānāntarasiddhi). For want of space this method cannot be applied everywhere. So we have adopted a middle course giving a fairly free translation in the main text, and subjoining a litteral one in the notes in such cases where the departure between the wording of the text and its meaning, as expressed in the language of the translation, is considerable, as f. i. in the concluding § of this translation. The main difficulty in this translation is to be able always to distinguish between the words of one interlocutor and the other, for there are no signs of division in the text. It often happens that questions are understood without being expressed. They have been added in brackets. Although ample use of brackets has been recurred to, it has not been possible to keep to it consistently. The titles of the §§ are of my own device.

<sup>1</sup> In the tib. translation these 3 stanzas are the closing words of the bhāṣya. They are preceded by the explanation of the last kīrikā of the koṣa and followed by a colophon. In the chinese translation of Hiuen-Tsang the stanzas are understood to be the introductory words of the Appendix (O. R.) In our Ms. of Yaçomitra's vyākhyā there is no colophon after the stanzas and the first question of the Appendix is interpreted as an objection to the last words of the stanzas. The Appendix is distinguished from the bulk of the bhāṣya by the absence of kīrikās. Saṃghabhadra closes his work with the interpretation of the last kīrikā and takes no notice of the Appendix. That the latter is no later addition is clear from its being mentioned in the course of the work, f. i. under V. 25.

<sup>2</sup> puñ-po rgyud kho-na-las = skandhasaṃtānād eva. The skandhas «groups of elements» are here the equivalent of the saṃskṛtadharmanas, with the distinction that some restricted reality is conceded to the skandhas whereas the āyatanas and dhātus are mere collections, cp. koṣa I. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Yaçom. refers to a stanza of a stotrakāra in corroboration of the fact that Buddha alone among all religious teachers denied the existence of a Soul:

sāhaṃkāre manasi çamaṇi yāti jaṃaprabandho  
nāhaṃkāraç calati hṛdayād ātmadrçṣṭau ca satyām,  
anyaḥ çāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādi  
nānyas tasmād upaçamaividhes tanmatād asti mārgaḥ.

<sup>4</sup> six kinds of objects (āyatanas or dhātus №№ 7—12), see table p. 731. Intellect (manas) is not an object, but an organ of cognition (№ 6). It nevertheless can become object, inasmuch as the preceding moment of consciousness is apprehended by the following one. Yaçom.: samantaraniruddhaṃ hi mano 'nantareṇa manovijñānena vijñāyate. Citta, manas and vijñāna are synonymous (cp. koṣa II, 34. Cf). Yaç.: cittaṃ mano vijñānam ekārtham iti yac cittaṃ tad eva manas tadeva vijñānam. ekārtho'syety ekārtham. It corresponds to the nirvikalpakaṃ jñānam of the Nīyayikas. cf. Koṣa I, 16 and Yaç.: vastumātra grahanam. But there is a manovijñāna (dhātu

№ 18), it represents no different dharma, but with respect to it the *manas* (i. e. *dhātu* № 6), represents the preceding moment. Others take intellect here to mean mental phenomena, such as hatred, pleasure, pain etc.; they are cognised directly by self-perception, contrary to cognitions by tradition (*āgama*), fancy (*vikalpa*) and ecstasy (*yoga*) (*Yaçom.*).

<sup>5</sup> *Yaçom.*: «How is it proved with precision that the cause must be the organ of sense? There must be some cause — only this is proved, but not that the cause is precisely the sense organ.» The question is solved by referring to the intuition (*prañidhāna*) of great men (*maharṣi*) and to universal consent about the existence of (invisible) organs of sense.

<sup>6</sup> The *Vatsīputriyas* make apparently a distinction between the terms *pudgala* and *ātman*, they are *pudgalavādinah*, but not *ātmavādinah*. But *Vasubandhu* holds the *pudgala* to be a concealed *ātman* and maintains that there is no difference between *pudgala*, *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, *manuṣa*, *puruṣa* etc., as far as all these notions are equally incompatible with the theory of separate elements and their interdependent functions. Cf. *Kāthāvatthu* p. a. p. 8: *puggalo, attā, satto, jīvo*.

<sup>7</sup> *Yaçom.*: *Vatsīputriyā āryasammattiyāḥ* (sic!). Both these schools are mentioned as *pudgalavādins* in the *Kāthāvatthu-ppakarāṇa-atthakathā*, p. 8, and by *Vasumitra* and *Bhavya*. In *Huen-Tsang's* time only one of them the *Sammitiyas* seem to have had practical importance, *emp. Rhys Davids J.R.A.S. 1891 p. 411 f.* Although there is a great difference in the method of exposing a scientific disquisition, between the *Kāthāvatthu* and *Vasubandhu*, still the arguments *pro* and *contra* are very often the same. We may conclude that *Vasubandhu's* exposition represents a fairly adequate picture of the battlefield on which the first dissensions raged at the time of the primitive schism. According to *Yaçomitra* the tenet of the *Vatsīputriyas* represents the following argument:

*Proposition*: an Individual is something really existing, but it is neither possible to maintain that it is different from its elements, nor is it possible to maintain that it is quite the same.

*Reason*: for an Individual is a name applied to an existence conditioned by the existence of its own causes — the elements.

*Example*: just as fire is a name applied to a fact, which is conditioned by the existence of its own cause — the fuel.

*General proposition*: an existence of which it is impossible neither to say that it is different, nor that it is quite the same as an other one which is its cause, and which receives a special name as a product of its own causes — such an existence is a reality.

*Conclusion*: Hence the Individual is a reality.

In the *Kāthāvatthu* the argument of the *Vatsīputriyas* and *Sammitiyas* in favour of the existence of Soul is substantially the same, but the form in which it is exposed, in accordance with the old system of dialectics, is quite different. It begins thus (*Kāthāvatthu* p. 1, *emp. atthakathā*, p. 8):

*Sthavira*. Do we have any real knowledge of a Soul as a reality? (*saccikattho= bhūtattho, paramattho= anussavādivasena agahetabbo*).

*Vatsīputriya*. Yes!

*Sthavira*. Hence it is cognised in the (same) manner (like all other) realities cognised by right knowledge?

*Vatsīputriya*. No!

In giving the first affirmative answer the *Vatsīputriya* has in mind that there is, in his opinion, an intermediate category of being which is neither transient, nor eternal, neither caused nor uncaused. Soul belongs to this category, hence it is a kind of reality. In denying the second question he means that Soul is not included neither in the *skandhas*, nor in the *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.

<sup>8</sup> It is clear from this passage that dharmas are ultimate or absolute realities, taking the term «absolute» in the second meaning as settled by *J. S. MILL*, *Examination of sir W. Hamilton's philosophy*, 6 ed. p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> What has no cause has no practical efficiency, it is practically non-existent. The *Vai-bhāṣikas* admit of 3 kinds of uncaused or eternal (*asaṃskṛta*) existence, but for *Vasubandhu* they

are conditioned existences (prajñaptisat). Yaçomitra refers to the celebrated stanza of Dharmakīrti about nonefficiency of eternal substance: It can be rendered thus:

The sun and rain what cau they do  
Regarding Space eternal?  
Efficient towards our skin they are:  
If Soul is similar to skin  
It must be non eternal,  
If it be similar to space  
It shall be unefficient.

Cf. Sarvad., chapter II.

<sup>10</sup> This very important definition is not explained by Yaçom.: da-ltar-gyi nañ-gi zin-pai puñ-po-rnams rgyur-byas-nas gañ-zag-tu lidogs-so = grhīta-pratyutpanna-abhyantara-skandhān upādāya pudgala-prajñaptiḥ. There is a division of the elements into inward and outward, cf. Koça I. 40. The inward include āyatanas №№ 1—6. The skandhas include elements past and future. Hence the pudgala would comprise only the elements of a personal life at a given moment.

<sup>11</sup> In order to understand this some idea must be given of the buddhist theory of matter. Matter is atomic. There are simple atoms (dravyaparamāṇu) and combined atoms (saṃghātaparamāṇu). The first do not appear separately. The combined ones include 4 atoms of «universal elements» (mahābhūta) conventionally termed earth, water, fire and air. But it is expressly stated that these are only conventional names, they denote respectively a hard stuff, a coagulating stuff, heat and motion (or more properly levity, for there is no moving substance, but only momentary apparitions). It is expressly stated that these «universal elements of matter» are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances. This is seen in the circumstance that the fourth element is motion, the third heat, the hard stuff in water f. i. is manifested by its supporting a ship, the coagulating stuff in a flame gives it its shape and prevents its parts from scattering asunder. They are called «universal» because «present everywhere, in every piece of matter, always in the same proportion, but in some combinations one or other energy may get greater intensity and we accordingly get hard and liquid stuffs, warm and moving bodies. Moreover there are in every combined atom at least four secondary atoms, what may be termed atoms of quality (bhautika): of colour, of smell, of taste and of touch, one of each. Consequently a combined atom consists at least of eight simple atoms. When matter resounds an atom of sound becomes present in every combined atom, it then consists of nine parts. The number increases in organic matter, the organs of sense being also a special atomic matter. Each secondary atom always has as its support a combination of four universal ones. According to other authorities the number of primary atoms supporting each atom of quality must be eight, two of each element. So it is that in-reality a combined atom has much more parts, but it is usually spoken of as consisting of eight kinds of matter at least. And this only in the spheres of defiled matter (kāmadhātu). In the higher regions of pure matter (rūpadhātu) smells and tastes are absent and the combined atom changes accordingly. It is seen from the preceding that there are no indivisible atoms in nature as conceived by the Buddhists. Contrary to the Vaiçeṣika system they do not admit eternal atoms. Like all the other realities (dharma) atoms are momentary existences, having no duration, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world from an unknown mysterious real world. The problem of infinite divisibility is solved by pointing to the character of an element (dharma). These elements are supposed to be very subtle, mysterious, rather forces than substances. Hence the very usual confounding of the forces (saṃskāras properly speaking) with the substances influenced by them (saṃskṛtadharmas). According to the Vaibhāṣikas we have in the phenomenal world only manifestations of these ultimate realities the dharmas, but we dont meet them themselves. About atoms cf. Koça II, 11, about dharmas cf. Koça V. 25, and O. ROSENBERG, Проблемы, ch. VII and XI.

<sup>12</sup> Litt. (95. b. 2): and if one must not say that it is different from the skandhas, there would be five kinds of cognizable (çes-bya for zhes-bya): the past the future, the present, the asaṃskṛta and the unspeakable. This cannot be said. (brjed-par-bya-ba-ma-yin-pao-lzhes brjed-par-mi-bya-

bar-hgyur = avaktavyam na vaktavyam prapnoti). It must be spoken of as neither the fifth with respect to the past etc., nor as the not fifth.

<sup>13</sup> We translate rūpa, when representing skandha № 1 «physical elements» or «matter», since it is then opposed to citta and cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra. But when it represents āyatana № 7 it may conveniently be translated by «colour and shape», according to the definition of this āyatana: rūpani dvidhā, samsthānavarṇabhedāt, cf. Koṣa I, 10 and I, 24.

<sup>14</sup> cchos-rmans = dharmāḥ i. e. āyatana № 12, the greater part of it consists of mental phenomena.

Not to be confounded with dharmas as a general term, it then includes all elements, matter as well as mind. Dharmāḥ includes skandhas 2, 3 and 4. Thus it is that saṃskāraskandha may conveniently be translated by volitions, for cetanā is the chief among the remaining saṃskāras, and Buddha himself has used it instead of the whole skandha, cf. Koṣa I, 15.

<sup>15</sup> hgal-bar instead of thal-bar (97. a. 1).

<sup>16</sup> myōn-ba yin-gyi for yin yul-gyi (97. a. 6).

<sup>17</sup> tib. 98. b. 2: brtags-pa-la (? gdags-pa-la) ihuñ-bar-zad-de. Yaç. prajñaptim anupapattitāḥ (anupatanti) iti yatraiva prajñaptiḥ kṛtā ātmeti vyavahārthaṃ tatraivābhīniviṣṭā ity arthaḥ.

<sup>18</sup> Htt. 98. b. 3 «here neither I nor mine exists, but suffering being born is only born (skye-ba-na skye-bar zad-do)». H. Th. has: «there is nothing but the dharmas of pain, which are (to be born, or are being born just now, or have already been born and so on). «Suffering» (duḥkha) is in this çāstra a technical term denoting the upādanakanhas, which is the same as the saṃskṛtadharms.

<sup>19</sup> 98. b. 3. Hgra-bcom-pa drug-gis kyañ (?) probably for dgra-bcom-ma brag-gis kyañ. H. Th. has «the bhikṣuñi-arhat Sila» and the comm. explains sila as meaning «a little hill». The pali text has Vajirā comp. Oldenberg, Buddha, 3 ed., p. 298.

<sup>20</sup> 98. b. 3 bdud-las brtsams-nas.

<sup>21</sup> These verses are found in Saṃyukt. Āg. 16-10 and also in the Pali Samy. Nik. I, 135, comp. Oldenberg, Buddha, 3 ed., p. 298. The tib. litt. means: «a sentient being, O Māra, what do you think (it is)? You have a (false) doctrine. This saṃskāraskandha (for saṃskṛtadharmanā) is void. In it there is no sentient being. Just as an aggregate of parts is given the name of a car, thus having the skandhas as a basis, we give them the name of a quite false sentient being».

<sup>22</sup> luñ phran thsegs = kṣudrakāgama.

<sup>23</sup> Or: I will explain the dharma which destroys all bonds. . .

<sup>24</sup> The chinese has: «already we see that the «inward» (i. e. that which is contained in the 5 skandhas) is void, (how much more) can we see that equally void is any «outward» (which is not even enumerated among the dharmas). According to Koṣa I, 39 the inward elements are consciousness and the 5 senses, the remaining ones, including all mental phenomena except consciousness, are outward, i. e. outward with respect to consciousness, the central dharma.

<sup>25</sup> ñes-dmigs = ādinava.

<sup>26</sup> srog-tu lta-bar-hgyur, but H. Th. has instead «leads to various erroneous paths».

<sup>27</sup> rnam-par grol-bar mi hgyur = na vimucyate, but Yaç. (yāvan) nādhimucyate.

<sup>28</sup> In all this passage the Vats. appear in the third person: de-ḍag-gis.... zhes zer-ro zhes drag-go.

<sup>29</sup> dharmatā.

<sup>30</sup> manovijñāna.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. above § 3.

<sup>32</sup> Litt.: if the pudgala would have been viewed as possessing rūpa, then, in consequence of the deduction of satkāyadṛṣṭi, this would be the occasion for «not being read in the sūtras».

<sup>33</sup> Litt. Bhāṣya. P. Bst. vol. 64 p. 100. a. 5.: And also because it would follow that «assuming the aggregates of elements» would not be comprised in the aggregates.

Yaç. comment. P. Bst. vol. 66, p. 389. b. 3-6: «The carrier»—this is an example. Therefore after having said «it is inadmissible that the burden should be the same as the carrier», he says: «it would also follow that «assuming the aggregates», (sksr. bhāridānasya «taking up of the

burden», tib. phuñ-po len-pa = skandhādānasya «assuming the groups, the chinese has tṣṅā «craving» (the definition of which (process) has been given, would neither be comprised in the aggregates», i. e. it would follow that it could not be comprised in the aggregates» just as the carrier (is not). But this we deny. Therefore the carrier is not something differing from the aggregates, just as (the fact) of assuming them is not.

<sup>34</sup> *Litt. Bhāṣya, f. 100. a. 5—7*: The carrier has been taught by the Sublime Lord for the express purpose that just so much may be known: beginning with «this venerable man having such a name» etc. ending with «after so long a life he will die at such an age», — that he may not be conceived in a different manner, as eternal, or as a personality. The former aggregates are merely exercising a pressure upon the next ones, hence they are called the burden and the carrier of the burden.

*Yaç. comment. p. 389. b. 6—390. a. 3*: «The carrier (has been taught) by the Sublime Lord in order that (so much may be known)» etc., after having stated all this at length, it is stated that «he must not be conceived as different». If the Individual would have been something really existing, then the Sūtra would have declared simply this: «who is the carrier? We must answer it is the Individual». But the analysis (of this notion) beginning with the words «this venerable man named so and so» and ending with «after so long a life he will die at such an age» would not have been given. And besides the gist of declaring these details is to make it known that the Individual is a conventional entity. It means: he, namely (the Individual), must be conceived as a conventional existence, the Individual must not be conceived as something different, as a real entity, as eternal, or as something it is impossible to give a definition of. «The former aggregates etc.» means: among the (aggregates) there are some which do oppress and are the cause of suffering, they are styled «burden», the next following ones, those who are oppressed, are styled «the carrier of the burden».

*The same passage as translated by Hiuen Tshang:*

*Vatsīputrīya. (1a—4)*. If there are only the 5 groups of elements, which conventionally might be called «I», then for what reason has the Lord said such (sentences as follow): «I shall now speak to you about the burden, about the taking up and the laying down of the burden, and about the carrier of the burden.

*Vasubandhu*. Why should Buddha here not have said so?

*Vatsīputrīya*. Because one cannot call the burden the carrier of the burden (i. e. the carrier cannot be contained in the 5 groups). And why? Because that has never been seen before.

*Vasubandhu*. In that case you likewise should not speak about some undefinable (fifth category of elements), because that too has never been seen before. Likewise (you could object) that, just as the carrier, the taking up of the burden cannot be contained in the groups, since it never has been seen, (that a burden is taking up itself). [But in the Sūtra by «taking up» the tṣṅā is meant, therefore it is contained in the groups. The same applies to the carrier, i. e. to the groups (of the present moment) the term puḍgala («that which takes different gati's») is conventionally applied. But Buddha was fearing that somebody might say: this puḍgala is some undefinable, everlasting, true reality.] Therefore in the (same) sūtra Buddha after these words gives himself an explanation, saying: «only following the way of common speech one says that this venerable man has such and such a name etc., as cited before in the phrase of the «sūtra about the man» (Samyuktāg. 13. 4). (He is saying so) to make it clear that this puḍgala can be said to be non-eternal, not having any essence of true reality i. e. the five groups are themselves troubling (P. destroying) each other and are therefore called burden. The previous moments which are drawing (Comm. the previous cause bears the result) the posterior ones are therefore called «carrier». Therefore there is no real puḍgala.»

In H.'s conception the carrier of the parable represents the previous moments, and the burden the posterior ones. But Yaç, on the contrary, explains the former ones as the burden, and the following ones as the carrier of the burden.

<sup>35</sup> *sems-can skye-ba-pa = upapādukaḥ sattvaḥ*. Yaç. explains: upapādukatvād ity upapādēna sādhuḥkāritvād ity arthaḥ, this is translated into tib. thus: *sems-can skye-ba-la* (for *skye-ba-*

pa) zhes-bya-ba ni skyes-bu-la mdzes-par-byed-pai-phyir-ro. (P. Bst. v. 66, f. 390. a. 4). In this way are born: gods, the inhabitants of hell and all men in the intermediate state between death and a new birth, i. e. without a seed, not from previous elements, as the Vats. believe.

The whole theory of apparitional or miraculous self births is exposed and discussed in the III section.

<sup>36</sup> Litt. f. 100. a. 8: just as by Buddha they have been analyzed, so they exist, so (we) say. Therefore this is a wrong view, (the view of) thus censuring (upavāda = skur-ba ldebs-pa): «whatever being is spontaneously born into another world, is not a being spontaneously born in the stream of skandhas», because the skandhas are spontaneously born.

H. Th.: just as Buddha has explained them, so we too explain them, namely if the five skandhas (of the intermediate state) proceed to a new life, which begins neither in the womb, nor in an egg, nor in warm moisture, then the result is called trasfigured being. To deny such beings, saying that there are none, is one of the false views, since the skandhas of the intermediate state must certainly exist.

<sup>37</sup> 100. b. 1 has gañ-la skur-pa hdi for gañ-zag-la skur-pa hdi.

Yaç: eṣā pudgalapavādikā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ . gañ-la skur-pa . . . could mean: «what you condemn is the wrong theory, the view namely that a spontaneous birth consists of elements».

<sup>38</sup> Litt.: «neither throwing away by the intuition of truth will do, nor the practise of ecstasy will do, because the pudgala is not included in the truths.» The doctrine of the 4 truths (āryasatyāni «the truths of the Saint») is exposed at the beginning of Section VI. In I, 39 it is stated that some elements (dhātu) undergoe extinction through rationalistic insight, others through the practise of ecstasy, and others (the eternal ones and prājñā amalā) do not undergo extinction altogether. The principal element to be extingāished by rationalistic insight in the error of «wrong personalism» (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and the 88 aṇuṇayas, which are conditioned by it. But there is no such error as the «denial of a pudgala» included in the list of elements, or in the «truths of the Saints». These truths represent the elements of existence viewed from the standpoint of their gradual extinction by the Saint during his progress towards final Salvation. If the denial of a pudgala would have been a wrong view, it would have found its place among the elements, and in the first two truths (duḥkha, samudaya), hence it would have been disposed of by the Saint in one of the prescribed ways. But we find the opposite view included in the list of dharmas under dṛṣṭi. Yaç. mentions that the second way, the practise of ecstasy, is not applicable for the same reason, i. e. because the denial of a pudgala is not included in the first two truths, «or because a wrong view is never cleared up through the practise of ecstasy». H. Th. has included these last words in his translation.

<sup>39</sup> Litt.: «if in the world also one pudgala is born, he is born», because it is thus declared, it is not the skandhas».

H. Th.: «there is some one pudgala born into existence, this cannot be identical with the skaudhas.»

<sup>40</sup> Litt. «again you must say that the pudgala is saṃskṛta, because it is combined with birth», saṃskṛta is here the counterpart of asaṃskṛta, i. e. eternal existences. Being combined with birth (utpattimattvam) is a token of being not permanent, being momentary, being involved in the process of phenomenal life.

<sup>41</sup> liṅga, tib has brtags for rtags.

<sup>42</sup> don-dam-pa stoñ-pa-ñid kyi mdo = paramārthaçūnyatvasūtra.

<sup>43</sup> Sc. in the embryonic state, mthsams-sbyor-bar byed-pa = patisaṃdadhāti.

<sup>44</sup> chos-su brdar-brtags-pa ma-gtogts-pa gañ-zhig. . .

Yaç: dharmasaṃketādi itī pratītyasamutpāda-lakṣaṇāt tenāha yad uta asmin satīti. The import of the tib. would accordingly be, that the only personality existing is the mutual interdependence of all the elements of existence. H. Th. has: there is no agent, it is a conventional designation.

<sup>45</sup> bdo-las-skyes kyi mdo = Phālgunasūtra.

Yaç. gives the reference at length: And if you ask what is the acting person like? I answer: he who throws away, who abandons the skandhas of the next life, somebody really

existing. O Phālguna! I dont say «he does take». If I were to say «he takes them», these words would afford thee pleasure, is it not so, Phālguna? Yes, master! Therefore there is no one who assumes the elements, or throws them off».

<sup>46</sup> H. Ths.: (20—4a) «Again if you say that you are supposing the new aggregates which appear to be something «one» (i. e. simple) and which you say are identical with the Ego, being in number not more than one, then positively you must suppose that the Ego is different from the aggregates and permanent. (But you the Vatsiputriyas are also saying that the Ego is not different, and not permanent).

<sup>47</sup> smra-ba hdi phyogs la-la yod-pa yin-no = ekadeḥya eṣo vādaḥ, H. Ths. «this is the mistake of that school». What school? Of the treatises of those who suppose that the produced rūpas coincide with the primary constituents».

<sup>48</sup> Kun-tu-rgyu smra-byed-kyis «by the speaking ascetic» (?)

<sup>49</sup> Yaç. supposes that the view of the grammarians is here alluded to: bhāvasya bhavitra-pekṣatvād iti vaiyākaraṇab. But Hiuen Tshang thinks that this controversy about an agent is directed against a Sāṃkhya philosopher. The aim of Vasubandhu is to establish that there are cognitions, but no real cogniser. This may be directed against the Sāṃkhya system where ātman is the cognising principle, but it does not agree with it inasmuch as the ātman is passive, not an agent. We retain the designation of Vatsiputriya as adversary, because, us usual, he may start questions not only in accordance with his own views (svamatena), but also from the standpoint of an other system (paramatam āçṛitya).

<sup>50</sup> Sārūpyam «coordination» is here meant to explain the connexion between consciousness and its object. It is clear that there is no «grasping» or «apprehending» of the object by knowledge according to Vasubandhu. The objective element is appearing simultaneously with the flashing of consciousness, both are independent, but there is a mutual correspondence between them. This reminds us partly of the Sāṃkhya view according to which knowledge is not influenced by its object, but merely reflects it. We meet this theory of sarūpya in a somewhat modified condition in later idealistic buddhist systems, comp. Nyāyabindu and ṭikā, I, 20, 21 and II, 4 in my edition. Bibl. Buddh. VII.

<sup>51</sup> We find, this definition in the Bhāṣya of Praçastapāda: aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ samyogab. The definition of the Vaiç. Sūtra VII, 2, 9 is different.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Pāṇini I, 4. 54.

<sup>53</sup> Litt. 108. a. 8: a continuity is citta (H. Th. rūpa and citta) following on an action and being produced later on; its change is its appearing always in another manner; a change which is capable at the end of bringing forth the result is a special change, because it is especially elevated above other changes, as f. i. consciousness at death, which is combined with assuming new existence.

<sup>54</sup> Litt. 108. b. 1: Although there is precedence of various actions the force created by those which are weighty, or are near, or inveterated manifest itself, others not. Accordingly it is said: «of the existing, previously accomplished actions weighty, near, accustomed to, each first, does ripen».

<sup>55</sup> This concluding section has been rendered freely, its closer translation would scarcely convey any definite meaning without a previous knowledge of the very complicated theory of different causes exposed in the second koçasthāna. Cf. O. Розенберг, Проблемы, ch. XV and L. de la Vallée Poussin, The way to Nirvāna p. 88 etc. We subjoin a literal translation:

(108. o. 3). Here the force to produce a vipākaphala which is produced by a vipākahetu disappears after having produced the vipāka. And the force which produces niṣyandaphala which is produced by a sabbāghahetu disappears after an antidote for kliṣṭa-(dharmas) has been produced. The continuity of consciousness of the akliṣṭas (= kuçala and anivṛtāvyaçṛta) is stopped at the time of final Nirvāna. (108. b. 5). But why does another vipāka not arise from the vipāka, like from a fruit's seed-grain (another seed-grain)? First of all every thing is not like the example. An even in this case the seed does not arise from the fruit directly. But how? It arises from a special change which is produced by special decomposition. The form which is produced from it which is the achiever of the sprout, this is the seed of it, not another. The previous course is

called seed by a future name or through similarity. (108. b. 7). Similarly also in this case, if from this vipāka a sāsravaçubha or açubha change of consciousness is produced, which is produced by such pratyaya as hearing etc. the good or not good law, then if another vipāka is produced from this vipāka, it is produced, in another way it is not, this is similar. (108. b. 8). Otherwise this may be conceived so. Just as from a matuliṅga-flower, after it having been changed in colour by the red lack juice, a red kesara-fruit is produced, from a specially changed continuity in the fruit, but from it no other one is produced, thus from a vipāka produced by action, further no other vipāka is produced. (109. a. 2). This little by my understanding conceived I have exposed. The causes being the influence (bsgos-pa = bhāvanā) of different actions through (their) different forces, having reached this state produce this result — this is the domain of Buddhas alone. Again it has been said: «action, the influence (bhāvanā) of it, the manifestation of it (vṛttilābha), the result of it no one else than Buddha necessarily thoroughly knows».

<sup>56</sup> The concluding verses are rendered according to the interpretation of Yaçomitra. Literally:

1. Having perceived this dharmatā (= nairātmyam, buddhānuçāsanī vā), which is pure through the well arranged path of argument of the doctrine of Buddhas, having rejected the doctrines of blind heretics which consist in various machinations of wrong dogmatism, those who are not blind proceed (from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa). Yaç.: the āryaçrāvākāḥ not blind, since they have the prajñācakṣuḥ, they have the knowledge of Soullessness, they are contemplating nirvāṇa with calmness because they are no more afraid of annihilation (ātmocheda).

2. This Soullessness the only path to the city of Nirvāṇa is illuminated through the lustre of the words of sunlike Tathāgatas, it is trodden by thousands of Saints, although open it is not perceived by the shortsighted.

3. I have exposed this little bit for the very learned, like a spot of poison of a wound it will diffuse by its own force. (Yaç.: there is an analogy between poison and learned men, since both proceed by their own capacity).

Huen Tshang gives the following translation of these verses:

Thus well we have explained the Path  
Which is the cause of pure (Nirvāṇa).  
Substantial Elements of Calm, (they are the Path),  
They are the highest Truth, as taught by Buddhas.

We must destroy the d gma of heretics, dark and blind,  
(We must reject) the fruit of their wrong view, — in search  
Of Wisdom's eye, (which sees that there is no «I»).

This one broad Path which to Nirvāṇa's palace leads,  
Is trodden by Saints in thousands. Substantial Elements —  
(Among them there is) no «I», (they are the Path).

(Innumerable) rays of sunlike Buddhas words  
Illuminate (this Path), but they, heretics,  
Are opening their eyes and — cannot see.

Now of this (Doctrine deep) rectangular,  
I made a short exposure, which intends  
To open in wise men a (little) gate, (a wound),  
Through which might enter wisdom poison-like.

O might you all according to your strength's capacity  
Become enlightened in all that may be known,  
So that you might perform exalted deeds  
(On all three paths that lead to Peace Eternal.)