


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
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## A WORD ABOUT BHĀMAHA

Bhāmaha is the earliest known author of a work on the theory of the literary art in ancient India, the fact which virtually almost all scholars of ancient Indian poetics accept. But that is all we can say with certainty about Bhāmaha, his life and work. And in this respect he is not an exception in Indian culture. Ancient India left us no manuscripts, historical chronicles, or biographical works. In his well-known book *Indiia v drevnosti* (“India in Antiquity”), the Academician G. M. Bongard-Levin particularly notes this phenomenon with a remark that it still requires explanation in the context of the historical and cultural processes that took place in ancient India [1]. Each Indologist dealing with ancient India cannot help putting the question of why India failed to produce a historical and biographical narrative. What were the reasons of this phenomenon? I allow myself to present here some observations on this question.

I think that an answer can only be obtained if the broader context of the emergence of authored texts, both literary and scholarly, is considered. This process begins with the overcoming of myth and the beginning of its critical treatment. In order to go beyond myth, beyond Homer and Vyāsa, one must break free of its total influence, of endless imitation, of endless variations on myth retelling. Everywhere this retelling was an indispensable and necessary stage to serve as a teaching model. To create a new text that differs from the traditional one, one must master the techniques of creating a traditional text. This is only natural. Thus appeared Herodotus and others. Nor should one forget that the ancients viewed the historical text as a sort of a literary one, which explains the stylistic nature of ancient historical writing.

But still the question remains: what prevented the Indians from producing their own Herodotus? It seems that three significant circumstances interfered: the idea of a karmic wheel of being; the idea of *kalpas* as a series of emergences and destructions of the world; and the “weight” of the *Mahābhārata*'s authority as a body of traditional learning seen by the ancient Indians as perfect in structure and form. Actually, the Indians failed to overcome its immense influence.

Historical narrative as literary text, as an imitation of the *Mahābhārata* and even the *Rāmāyaṇa*, represents itself as the *Raghuvaṃśa*, *Harshacharita*, and other texts. But the Indians took their first step toward History in the classical *purāṇas* patterned along the lines of the *Mahābhārata*. A special genealogical section appeared there, being a natural initial step on the path to a historical text. Time was

needed for the second step, this time to overcome the “weight” of the *purāṇas*' authority. Of course, long-standing social and political stability was also needed, for only in conditions of such stability can culture exist and develop in all its facets. The last *purāṇas* are not far chronologically from the first Muslim invasions, which provoked the harsh, implacable conservative reaction of traditional circles eager to defend all that was theirs and traditional. As paradoxical as this may seem, India did not have enough historical time for natural and peaceful development to create its own historical text.

So we know nothing of Bhāmaha, or Kalidāsa, for example, except their names. Not even are we sure that the word “Bhāmaha” is not a pseudonym. True, Ju. M. Alikhanova and I. D. Serebriakov write that Bhāmaha was a Kashmirian and belonged to the Kashmir school of poetics [2]. Nevertheless, we do not know when Bhāmaha was born and to what family; when and who his teacher(s) were; how he arrived at his theory of the literary art and when he wrote his only known work on the theory of the literary text, the *Kāvyaśāstrā*, whose title up to now was usually given in a transliteration. Scholars sometimes try to translate it, usually like the compound word *tatpuruṣa* (“Adornment of Poetry”, or “Poetic Adornments”) [3], but this translation only makes sense if *kāvya* is “poetry” and *śāstrā* is “adornment”. This only holds if *Kāvyaśāstrā* is, in Sanskrit linguistic terminology, a compound word of the type *tatpuruṣa*. However, the question is open to discussion. Originally *kāvya* designated a special text, literary or scholarly, that differed from the profane and required mastery in the telling. In the words of Bhāmaha himself:

“*vṛtta-deva-ādi-carita-śamsi cotpādya-vastu ca | kalā-śāstra-āśrayaṃ ceti caturdhā bhidyate punaḥ ||*”

“[*kāvya* can be] divided into four types: tales of the deeds of the gods, etc., about [true] events; about imagined events; treatises on the arts and scholarly works” (I, 17) [4].

From this follows that *kāvya* is both a literary and a scholarly text. Later, in the context of Bhāmaha's work, *kāvya* came to mean “literary art, literary text”.

As for the word *śāstrā*, it is usually given in dictionaries and translations to mean “adornment”. But Bhāmaha's *śāstrā* is not “adornment” but “artfully done”, “something skillful” (*alam + kr* “to do well, artfully, skillfully”), a literary utterance, or *alamkāraḥ vākyaḥ*, or, as Bhāmaha

prefers to phrase, — *alaṅkāra uktiḥ*. His third and fourth chapters deal with *guṇa* (“true”) and *doṣa* (“false”) *alaṅkāras* or *uktis*. (Interestingly, F. I. Stcherbatsky mentioned in passing with his usual acumen that *alaṅkāra* is a figure of poetic speech [5].)

The word *kāvyaḷaṅkāra* can be read not only as a compound word of the type *tatpuruṣa*, but also as a compound attributive (*bahuvrihi*) that requires a determinate. The determinate, omitted on the “title” page of the manuscript, first published by the Indian scholar K. P. Trivedi in 1909, was apparently the word *grantha*, or “book”. The manuscript Trivedi published was written in southern India in southern Indian writing. It is rather late and reached us in a single copy. The title of Bhāmaha's work can be translated as “A Book on Skillful Expression in the Literary Art”, which adequately conveys the title's meaning.

It is appropriate to note here that the determinate is frequently omitted in the *śāstras* in the phrase *bahuvrihi* + noun. With the frequent omission of the determinate, there arises a tendency to interpret the compound word *bahuvrihi* as a noun. This is what occurred, in my view, with the word *alaṅkāra*.

The main object of Bhāmaha's study is the same as in the entire Indian poetological tradition — the isolated literary utterance, which is only natural for that stage of development of authorial texts to which Bhāmaha belonged, since if the plot of the authorial work is set by tradition and imposed by theory, the author's opportunities for invention at this stage are limited. It is only the isolated utterance that he has for variation and creativity [6]. He does not have to think about composition, or what he will say. All of this he will take from the oral folk tradition, primarily the *Mahābhārata*, that treasure-trove of stories and ideas. When he speaks about what the Master of literary art should know, Bhāmaha stresses that he should know the tales and narratives of the *Mahābhārata* through and through (I, 9).

In essence, virtually all of the Indian poetological tradition deals with the individual utterance. Far too few took heed of F. I. Stcherbatsky's fruitful observation that the sentence in ancient India was studied not by linguists, but by *alaṅkārikas*.

Beginning with Bhāmaha, the theoreticians of literature explored the possibilities of the literary art utterance, considering it from various angles. After research on the metaphoric nature of the literary utterance (Bhāmaha and a number of later theoreticians), they turned their attention to its role in evoking certain feelings and emotions (the teaching of *rāsa*). Later, beginning with Ānandavardhāna, they tried to reveal the expressive possibilities hidden behind the explicit text. Indian literary theoreticians squeezed nearly all they could out of the isolated literary utterance. Unfortunately, they stopped short of problems of composition and its constitutive role in the literary text, problems of plot construction, etc. This seems to have been connected with foreign invasions, the rule of Muslims and other conquerors, and, practically, with the end of the creative period in the history of Indian literary theory. But even what they accomplished is more than enough for India to take pride in its contribution to the study of literary culture.

Bhāmaha's work consists of six chapters. The first two deal with general theoretical reflections on the literary arts, their Masters, the nature of the artistic gift, the important role of metaphor in the utterance, the relationship between knowledge and talent, their role in literary creativity, etc. It

is striking that Bhāmaha, despite the distance between his time and ours, valued so highly the literary text and literary creativity, equating the talented Master of literary art to the gods. Also striking is his ability to hear and rage at ungifted utterances which infuriated him. In his words, the text without talent is somewhat of a crime.

Chapters three and four enumerate and evaluate true and false literary utterances. There is no doubt that this division of literary utterances into true and false was suggested to Bhāmaha by ancient Indian logicians. It was specialists on logic, according to Nyāya, who divided utterances (*vākya*) into true and false. (Bhāmaha was a great connoisseur of Nyāya.)

Chapter five juxtaposes two types of utterances — the literary and the logical [7]. Chapter six is linked with the grammar of Sanskrit and such names as Pāṇini and Patañjali. Bhāmaha emphasizes that writer need to know the language in which they write, the issue that has hardly lost its relevance. This is a structure of Bhāmaha's work.

One might ask whether Bhāmaha's work is a study or a textbook. S. K. De, when speaking about ancient Indian poetics before Ānandavardhāna, remarks: “Like Grammar, Poetics started as an empirical and normative study...”; “...more or less mechanical study... oldest available manuals like those of Bhāmaha” [8]. This view was shared by many who wrote on the history of Indian poetics. It seems that scholars, including S. K. De, unconsciously compared Bhāmaha with, say, Aristotle in his “Poetics”. It should be noted, however, that “Poetics” is not the title given to the work by Aristotle himself. The title of the work, which, unfortunately, has only come down to us in part, was added by his first publishers. As a matter of fact, his so-called “Poetics” has little to do with poetics. What Aristotle writes about in this work is related rather to scholarly aesthetics and its historical beginnings, or so it seems to me. Classicists may curse at this, or they may not. The poetics must be mainly found in his “Rhetorics”.

Unfortunately, S. K. De's view lacks historical approach. In fact, Bhāmaha's work is neither a textbook nor a normative text. It is a true study. One need not dwell on the first two chapters, which form a striking study. Chapters three and four are a fruitful attempt to identify and describe the turns of phrase and literary utterances characteristic of the literary text. It seems that such an approach, for all its historical specifics, would make sense to specialists on machine translation.

Bhāmaha described literary utterances with a term that he was the first to introduce — *vakrokti* (descriptive, or figurative utterances). According to Bhāmaha, each literary utterance must contain an image. The term *vakrokti* should be left in the original like other terms, for it is richer in content than a literal translation of the words it comprises. Nonetheless, leaving aside Bhāmaha's reflections on the specific structure of the literary utterance and his distinction between the literary utterance and the syllogistic or profane utterance, many Indologists have tried to grasp the meaning of the term *vakrokti* through its literal translation — “bent speech” [9]. However, this literal translation hinders more than it helps. The word *ukti* in the context of Bhāmaha's work means not “speech” but “utterance”. And *vakra* (lit. “bent”) can only be properly understood in the context of Bhāmaha's contraposition of the literary and syllogistic utterance. Thus, *vakra* here means indirect, descriptive, not

direct, linear, or syllogistic. In chapter two, Bhāmaha explains the meaning of the term *vakrokti*, saying that it is derived from *atiśayokti* (2, 81). In his article on Bhāmaha, K. P. Trivedi gives the following interpretation of the word *atiśayokti*: “‘*lokātikrāntagocaraḥ vacaḥ*’, ‘an unusual utterance that goes beyond the bounds of ordinary things, a non-profane utterance’” [10]. I wholly agree with this interpretation which is historically justified and appropriate both to the context of Bhāmaha's work and his reflections on the essence of the literary utterance. For the authors who came after Bhāmaha, however, the term *atiśayokti* designated one of the *alankāras* — exaggeration.

Bhāmaha is especially impressive in chapter five. Here for the first time we encounter, for all its naïveté, an attempt to juxtapose the syllogistic and literary utterance, an attempt to follow the logicians' example and describe the literary utterance and its structure. This is undoubtedly an original study without peer in the poetological tradition. It bears witness to the serious, profound scholarly reflection that did not make its way to the page. One is tempted to ask what moved Bhāmaha to create such a study. It seems that his work was preceded by thoughts on the text in general and its various types — the scholarly text, scholarly thought, the literary text and literary thought, how these two differ from profane texts that require no art and from what Bhāmaha called *vārtā* (ordinary text and speech). Bhāmaha's thoughts, which we reconstruct when necessary from the gist of chapter five, remain relevant to this day. It is appropriate to recall the USSR Academy of Sciences Scholarly Council on World Culture headed by the late Academician B. B. Piotrovsky. Head of the Council's Composite Commission was Prof. B. S. Meilakh. In the 1970s, his Commission conducted a series of all-Union scholarly symposia on the relationship between scholarly and literary thought and the connection between scholarly and literary texts. The sessions drew the participation of scholars from the natural sciences and the humanities: physiologists, cyberneticists, mathematicians, philosophers, literary theorists, linguists, etc. The results of each symposium were published as a collection of articles. In 1971, drawing on these collections, Prof. Meilakh published a monograph called “On the Border Between Science and Art”, and, in 1980, he edited the collection “The Psychology of Artistic Creativity”. Still it remains striking that 15 centuries before the Commission took shape, the outstanding ancient Indian thinker Bhāmaha posed the question in chapter five of his work. In general, his significance as a scholar is underappreciated. The figure of Daṇḍin, for example, is taken more seriously, although it was Bhāmaha who set out in his work all the questions that would later form the core of the Indian poetological tradition [11]. Although Bhāmaha cites his several predecessors, whose works have not come down to us, he has every right to be considered the founder of ancient Indian poetics.

Bhāmaha seems to have been a modest man. He is unlikely to have described himself using the phrases that we are so bold as to apply to him. He begins chapter five humbly, disingenuously announcing to the reader that in this chapter he intends to show writers, Masters of the literary art, how to avoid simple logical errors in their work. His observations had apparently led to realize that these Masters at best had more talent than knowledge or education. (This tradition stretches up through our time.) Yet he had no intention of teaching anyone anything. He

was simply unable to being his study of the two types of utterances without some sort of cover. Nor was he sure that his colleagues and contemporaries would understand him and appreciate him (V,69). In fact, Daṇḍin, a seventh-century author if the chronology is to be believed, asked angrily in his *Kāvya-darśa*, clearly aiming at Bhāmaha: “Why deal with the syllogism in a study of the *alankāra*?” [12]. Bhāmaha's modesty makes sense: he was far ahead of his time.

Bhāmaha's work reveals the author's encyclopaedic education. He knew philosophy, linguistics, semantics, lexicography, treatises on the arts (there are 64 of them), logic (both orthodox and Buddhist), debates in scholarly circles, the epic, medicine, and much else that made up learning in ancient India. As is known, in the Indian educational system at that time knowledge was conveyed directly from teacher to pupil and had to be mastered orally. We learn all of this about him not from his own admissions, nor from those of others, but from what we can deduce from his work if we give it our due attention.

I think that the preceding is sufficient to refute any attempt to deride Bhāmaha's work as mechanistic, normative, or a textbook. We repeat that in all his *kārikās* he acts as an original researcher who poses fruitful questions, often a more important function in scholarship than discovering the answer to a question.

What of didactics, then? We should recall that Bhāmaha lived and worked in an age when scholarship was taking shape in ancient India, at an age when the conceptual language of scholarship was emerging even as he contributed to it. If we approach the problem historically, the didacticism of the ancient scholarly works will not surprise us. It was inevitable in antiquity. What is surprising are the discoveries that occurred in India in all realms of human knowledge — mathematics, astronomy, linguistics, medicine, politics, economics, etc.

It seems to me that within Indo-European culture, classical and ancient Indian culture existed and functioned through the principle of complementarity. If classical culture abounds in historians, then ancient Indian culture astounds with an abundance of religious-philosophical, ethical, and psychological works.

As was said above, the dates of Bhāmaha's life remain disputed: the question is not one of years, but rather of establishing a more or less certain century. In the absence of additional sources, one can only try to find a hold in Bhāmaha's own work. Since Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, who is with relative certainty dated to the seventh century, examine similar problems, one can conduct a purely scholastic discussion over who lived earlier or later. But Daṇḍin's remark about the futility of examining syllogisms in poetics is undoubtedly addressed to Bhāmaha, since there is no other text to which it could apply. This clearly removes any doubts over who came first. There can be only one answer: it was Bhāmaha who lived earlier. Two quotations from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin seem to prove that. Bhāmaha says:

“*atha pratijñā-hetv-ādi-hīnam duṣṭam ca varnyate  
samāseṇa yathā-nyāyaṃ tan-mātra-artha pratīṭaye.  
prāyeṇa dur-bodhatayā śāstrād bibhyaty-amedhasaḥ  
tad-upacchandānāyāiṣa hetu-nyāya-lavocayāḥ.  
svādu-kāvya-rationmiśram śāstram apyupayujate  
prathama-ālīdha-madhavaḥ pibanti kaṭu bheṣajam*”.

“Later in according with [the teaching of] Nyāya, of whom [we speak here] briefly, only to introduce his subject, there are described [such] errors [of syllogism] as the false thesis, false logical reason, etc.

The *śāstras* usually inspire fear in unknowing [people] because of their complexity. This is a small excerpt from [the teaching of] Nyāya [intended] to ‘reconcile’ [them with the *śāstras*]. [They] can ‘get a taste’ of the *śāstra* if they mix it with a drink of sweet *kāvya*. But [they] will drink bitter medicine if they first lick honey” (V, 1–3).

Daṇḍin's statement runs as follows:

“*pratijñā-hetu-drṣṭānta-hānir doṣo na vety asau vicāraḥ karkaśaḥ prāyas tena ālīdhena kiṃ phalam*”.

“As concerns the thesis, logical reason, and ‘example’ in [a syllogism], [for *kāvya* it is all the same] [if they are formulated] correctly or incorrectly.

What, after all, is the point of ‘licking’ a crude syllogism” (D. III, 127).

There is only one way to determine the dates of Bhāmaha's life more exactly. One must look at whom he knows of the people who worked before him or during his time and whom he does not know among those who came later. The scholar in the first half of the first millennium in India faced stiffer standards than we do today. It was a time of encyclopaedic knowledge. A scholar of the time was required to know all the accomplishments of scholarship. Bhāmaha was, as we have noted above, familiar with all the scholarly disciplines that were developing at his time. The accepted dating suggests that he could not have failed to know, for example, the famed Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (7th century A. D.). However, Bhāmaha does not know him. It was G. Jacobi who was the first to suggest that Bhāmaha cites Dharmakīrti in chapter five, which served him as the basis for dating Bhāmaha to the seventh century. In his “History of Sanskrit Poetics” and many subsequent works [13], S. K. De repeats the idea in his “History of Sanskrit Poetics” and many subsequent works. We have examined Jacobi's arguments, compared the texts of Dharmakīrti that he indicates with Bhāmaha's text, and concluded without doubt that Bhāmaha did not cite Dharmakīrti.

For this reason, we repeat that the most fruitful approach to dating Bhāmaha is to try to establish the group of scholars and scholarly texts that he knew. This method was pushed by J. Tucci, A. K. Worder, Iu. M. Alikhanova, and your humble servant.

J. Tucci's remarks can be summarized as follows [14]:

1) Bhāmaha defines direct appreciation according to Vāsubandhu and Dignāga. The first is responsible for the definition *pratyakṣam tato'rthāt*; the second for *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham*.

2) The definition *kalpanā* (= *nāmajatyādiyojanā*) cited by Bhāmaha belongs to Dignāga. Dharmakīrti defines this term differently.

3) Bhāmaha cites two definitions of the term *anumāna*: a) *trirūpāllīngato jñānam*; b) *tadvido nāntarīyārthadarśanam*. While the first definition goes back to Dignāga, the second belongs to Vāsubandhu.

4) Bhāmaha defines the first member of the syllogism according to Vāsubandhu, citing the indisputable difference between *pakṣa* (= *sādhyā*) and *pakṣa* (= *pratijñā*). This dis-

inction shows that Bhāmaha must have known Asaṅga's and Vāsubandhu's views on *sādhyā* and *sādhana*.

5) Bhāmaha enumerates six types of erroneous thesis, Dignāga five, Śaṅkarasvāmin nine, Dharmakīrti four. Four of Dignāga's types are reflected in Bhāmaha's classification.

6) The teaching of the three qualities of logical reason — *trayirūpyahetu* — goes back to Vāsubandhu. The definition of the negative example in the sumption is given by Bhāmaha in expressions that are found only in the *Tarkaśāstra*.

7) Bhāmaha gives two definitions of *drṣṭānta*. One goes back to Vāsubandhu; the other virtually identical to Dignāga.

A. K. Worder adds a significant observation:

8) Bhāmaha describes a three-member syllogism, following Vāsubandhu, not Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, whose *sādhana* consists of two members — *hetu* and *drṣṭānta* [15].

We can add nine other observations to the preceding:

9) Bhāmaha does not use the terms *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, which are typical of Dharmakīrti. Significantly, the terms do not occur in Dignāga's early text *Nyāyamukha*, although it has been established that they were introduced by Dignāga.

10) Bhāmaha does not use the terms *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (typical of Dharmakīrti) to designate individual and general objects of knowledge, although it has been established that they were introduced by Dignāga.

11) Bhāmaha describes three qualities of *hetu* in expressions not found in texts by Dignāga, Śaṅkarasvāmin, and Dharmakīrti. Bhāmaha does not use the term *pakṣadharmatā*.

12) Bhāmaha's brief remarks on Nyāya's main theses in chapter five shows that Nyāya for Bhāmaha is closely connected with *vāda*, the teaching of the art of argument, and with *vādavidhi*, while Dignāga, Śaṅkarasvāmin, and especially Dharmakīrti demonstrate the significant development of Nyāya away from *vivāda* toward logic.

13) Bhāmaha's definition of *dūṣaṇa* shows that Bhāmaha on this issue followed not Dharmakīrti, but earlier sources.

14) Bhāmaha defines *jāti* — false refutation — not according to Dharmakīrti, but according to earlier sources.

15) Bhāmaha considers it necessary to cite two definitions each time Dignāga's definitions differ from Vāsubandhu's in meaning or expression. He does not cite definitions that belong to other, later authors. One can conclude from this that when he cites a single definition, it is Vāsubandhu's.

16) The bulk of definitions Bhāmaha cites belong to Vāsubandhu. He treats Dignāga's definitions as an addition and an adjustment to Vāsubandhu.

17) Bhāmaha uses phraseology that reflects an earlier stage in the development of the *yogācāra*'s logic, the stage of Vāsubandhu and the early Dignāga [16].

It would seem that the preceding is sufficient to state with confidence that Bhāmaha should be dated to the fourth — fifth century A. D. There is no basis for any other dating. There is only the habit of repeating what was once said by an authoritative scholar.

In trying to describe Bhāmaha, we have here focused on the larger picture. Yet his work contains many things that are worthy of attention in speaking and writing of

Bhāmaha. I hope that I have succeeded here in demonstrating the stature of this outstanding scholar.

### Notes

1. G. M. Bongard-Levin, G. F. Il'in, *Indiia v drevnosti* (India in Antiquity) (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 8. See also V. I. Rudoi, E. A. Ostrovskaia, *Uchenie ob istoricheskom vremeni i obshchestve v klassicheskoi indiiiskoi filosofii* (The Theory of Historical Time and Society in Classical Indian Philosophy) (Moscow, 2002), p. 22.
2. Ananadavardhana, *Dhvan'ialoka*, trans. from Sanskrit into Russian by Ju. M. Alikhanova (Moscow, 1974), p. 26. See also I. D. Serebriakov, *Pamiatniki kashmirskoi sanskritoiazychnoi literaturnoi obshchnosti* (Texts of the Kashmirian Sanskrit-language Literary Community) (Moscow, 1982), p. 49.
3. See e. g., Ananadavardhana, *Dhvan'ialoka*, p. 26.
4. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśāhikāra*, ed. K. P. Trivedi (Bombay, 1909).
5. F. I. Shcherbatskoi (Stcherbatsky), "Teoriia poëzii v Indii" ("The theory of poetry in India"), in *Izbrannye trudy russkikh indologov-filologov*, comp. by I. D. Serebriakov (Moscow, 1962), p. 286.
6. P. A. Grintser, *Tema i ee variatsii v sanskritskoi poëtike* (The Themes and its Variations in Sanskrit Poetics) (Moscow, 1994).
7. E. N. Tëmkin (Tyomkin), *Mirovozzrenie Bkhamakhi* (Bhāmaha's World-View) (Moscow, 1975), pp. 6–7.
8. S. K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Calcutta 1960), i, p. 13. *Idem*, *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics* (Oxford—Bombay, 1963), p. 2.
9. P. A. Grintser, *Osnovnye kategorii klassicheskoi indiiiskoi poëtiki* (Basic Categories of Classical Indian <sup>Poetics</sup> ~~Poetry~~) (Moscow, 1987), p. 16.
10. K. P. Trivedi, "Some notes on Bhāmaha", *Commemorative Essays Presented to R. G. Bhandarkar* (Poona, 1917), p. 407.
11. Ananadavardhana, *Dhvan'ialoka*, p. 26.
12. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaadarṣa*, translation, commentaries and introduction by P. A. Grintser (Moscow, 1996).
13. De, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
14. G. Tucci, "Bhāmaha and Dignāga", *Indian Antiquary* (July, 1930), pp. 142–7.
15. A. K. Warder, "The date of Bhāmaha", *Journal of Oriental Research*, 26 (1956–57), pp. 93–106.
16. Tëmkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–2.